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The USSOCOM Trinity: Refining Special Operations 
Commitment to 21
st
 Century Warfare  
Dave Kenney 
This essay examines the ramifications of the new Defense Strategic 
Guidance on the United States Special Operations Command and 
recommends means and methods to capitalize on current success. 
These recommendations offer the National Command Authority and 
the USSOCOM Commander a single-source global capability to 
prevent and deter large-scale contingencies by leveraging a whole-of-
government approach through Special Operations Forces operating as 
the forward edge of American influence. 
The Defense Strategic Guidance issued on 5 January 2012 changes the paradigm under 
which the American Military Establishment prepared to fight wars for the last 20 years. 
What follows is an examination of the ramifications of this change in regard to its impact 
on United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and suggestions for a 
means and method in fiscally-constrained environments to provide the United States of 
America with a global capability to prevent and deter large-scale contingencies through 
the transformative utilization of existing Special Operations Forces. By reinforcing 
success in USSOCOM‟s own model for countering terrorism and replicating the efficacy 
of subordinate unified commands and Joint Task Forces, USSOCOM will remain the Tip 
of the Spear.  
 Following the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the 
underpinning of national defense planning was the ability to fight and win two Major 
Theater Wars nearly simultaneously. While the term Major Theater War was eventually 
refined to Major Theater Conflict, the overall understanding was that the American 
military would plan, train, and equip to conduct major combat operations on opposite 
sides of the globe at the same time. This was often termed the win-win or win-hold-win 
strategy. While the Pentagon‟s ability to realistically execute this strategy was often 
debated inside and outside the beltway through contracting and expanding budgets, the 
basic notion held. 
 The January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) departs from the two-decade-
old strategy by describing essentially a win-spoil strategy in which the American military 
will plan, train, and equip to meet one major regional conflict while reserving the ability 
to “deny the objectives of or [impose] unacceptable costs on an opportunistic aggressor in 
a second region.”1  
 The DSG is meant to be a “blueprint for the Joint Force in 2020, providing a set of 
precepts that will help guide decisions regarding the size and shape of the force over 
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subsequent program and budget cycles. . .”2 Couched in terms of fiscal responsibility, the 
document calls for a military that is “smaller and leaner . . . agile, flexible, ready, and 
technologically advanced.”3 In a nutshell, the National Command Authority expects the 
Department of Defense to do more with less, reduce costs, and maintain readiness. 
Ramifications for USSOCOM 
No direct mention of Special Operations Forces is made in the DSG. Indeed, the term 
Special Operations is never used in the document. However, a close reading of the nine-
page document determines that much of the tenets of Special Operations nest well inside 
the new strategy. The flexibility, agility, and diffuse operations suggested as a goal for 
the military, writ large, are fundamentals upon which Special Operations are based. 
Additionally, experience gained from a decade of global operations may put Special 
Operations at the forefront of the transformative change directed in the DSG.   
 The preceding decade has seen a continual expansion of United States Special 
Operations Command from its legislated U.S. Code Title 10 authorities and 
responsibilities to new and increasingly broad responsibilities. The 2004 Unified 
Command Plan designation of USSOCOM as the Department of Defense (DOD) lead for 
synchronizing operations against global terrorist networks was followed by the 2008 
designation as the DOD proponent for Security Force Assistance and most recently by 
nomination as the DOD lead for countering threat financing.
4
 These additional and 
growing responsibilities represent an increasingly unique position for USSOCOM as a 
unified command. 
 Additionally, the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance puts a priority on fiscal 
stewardship while calling for a smaller “military [that] is agile, flexible and ready for the 
full range of contingencies.”5 The document also emphasizes “the need for a globally 
networked approach to deterrence and warfare.”6 Remarks by Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey at the Atlantic Council on 9 December 2011 
may have foreshadowed the changes in the newest DSG. As reported by Inside the 
Army‟s Sebastian Sprenger, “Dempsey delivered his thoughts in the form of a question. 
„SOCOM is currently a functional command. Should we consider that SOCOM is the 
global combatant command, and most everybody else [is in support]?‟” 7 
 Whether the DSG opens the door for the current administration to designate 
USSOCOM as a Global Combatant Command rather than a functional unified command 
is open for debate; however, the concept is not new. First proposed by then-Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld shortly after the 9/11 terror attacks, USSOCOM as a Global 
Combatant Command met with resistance inside and outside of Special Operations.
8
 In a 
culture organized around strategic preparation based on the National Security Act of 
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1947, amended by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, any efforts to deploy forces 
outside the purview of Geographic Combatant Commanders questions the efficacy of the 
GCC in handling 21
st
 century threats.  
 Given a changing strategic military posture and the ever-broadening 
responsibilities, this paper moves beyond the debate as to whether USSOCOM should 
become a Global Combatant Command for Special Operations and examines how it 
could meet that demand within the constraints and opportunities afforded by the new 
Defense Strategic Guidance.  
 Globalization and economic technology-transfer has proffered the rise of 
transnational non-state and sub-state actors. Criminal organizations such as narco-
trafficking syndicates and violent extremist organizations increasingly cross regional 
Areas of Responsibility and, in some cases, purposely exploit the inherent seams of the 
Unified Command Plan. This premise is described in Joint doctrine in some detail: 
“Globalization and emerging technologies will allow small groups to use asymmetric 
approaches to include criminal activity, terrorism, or armed aggression on a transnational 
scale with relative ease and with little cost.”9 
 The DSG, in characterizing this “Challenging Global Security Environment,” 
describes the general policy for countering these threats: 
For the foreseeable future, the United States will continue to take an active 
approach to countering these threats by monitoring the activities of non-state 
threats worldwide, working with allies and partners to establish control over 
ungoverned territories, and directly striking the most dangerous groups and 
individuals when necessary. 
10
 
 Accepting the contemporary success in employment of counterterrorism forces, the 
author proposes the creation of two additional functional subordinate unified (sub-
unified) commands that replicate the model. Further recommendations include functional 
Joint Task Forces created to provide a „cradle-to-grave,‟ mission-oriented command 
structure leveraged against specific problem sets.  Also advanced here is the 
establishment of Pan-Agency Special Staffs at almost every operational level of 
USSOCOM to plan, advise, and resource complementing capabilities and to integrate the 
whole-of-government approach into Special Operations as required.  
The Trinity 
When authorized by the SecDef through the CJCS, commanders of unified 
commands may establish subordinate unified commands (also called sub-
unified commands) to conduct operations on a continuing basis in accordance 
with the criteria set forth for unified commands. --Joint Publication 1, pg. xii 
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 Referred to here as The Trinity, this proposal represents a trio of subordinate 
unified (sub-unified) commands organized and determined by functional area and 
mission set to synchronize and execute the full spectrum of special operations missions 
on a global scale. Applying a very successful model developed for global execution of 
authorities, USSOCOM would create two additional sub-unified commands: a Strategic 
Development Special Operations Command (STRATDEVSOC) and a Special Activities 
Command (SACOM) and also execute missions within the Direct Action Special 
Operations Command (DASOC).  
 STRATDEVSOC works with and through partner nations to build military capacity 
and capability, conducts humanitarian aid, and assists civil development.  These functions 
go beyond the traditional mission of Foreign Internal Defense and now Security Force 
Assistance to provide a long-term planning staff focused on indirect methods of 
countering extremism through investment and development. The bulk of USSOCOM‟s 
efforts in the near term would be under this command: deterring and preventing future 
threats and countering influence and extremist propaganda by building global 
relationships on American values and interests. This is where USSOCOM, as global 
purveyors of American interests, seeks to fight ideals with ideas. 
 STRATDEVSOC is also responsible for Special Operations support to the Theater 
Security Cooperation Plan, incorporating the Theater Special Operations Commands 
(TSOCs) as operational headquarters for current operations. Through the synchronization 
of Joint Combined Exchange Training, Counter Narcotics Training, Joint Advisory 
Teams, and select deployments of forward headquarters, Persistent Engagement becomes 
a reality—not just a talking point. Operationalizing the TSOCs under one unified 
command provides the ability to synchronize events, prioritize efforts, and allocate 
resources across Areas of Responsibility.  
 SACOM unifies all SOF efforts in Network Development and Illumination and 
provides a standing headquarters for Unconventional Warfare (UW) (Figure 1 depicts 
proposed Lines of Effort for all three sub-unified commands). This capability ensures that 
specific UW plans are tied directly to the National Security Strategy and are available as 
stand-alone, fully-developed options or as components to conventional plans. The 
command is also focused on Network Illumination, defined here as identifying all 
pertinent components of organizations or entities posing threats to the U.S. Network 
Development is the ability to „see‟ beyond the horizon into denied locations and 
organizations by building networks of human and technical infrastructure. Additionally, 
SACOM becomes the coordination point within USSOCOM for Countering Threat 
Finance. Traditional functions and programs that fill intelligence gaps when other means 
are not available are also incorporated into SACOM.  
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    Figure 1. Proposed lines of effort for three sub-unified commands 
  
 Direct Action Special Operations Command is focused on fixing and finishing 
threats to the United States and its interests. Associated mission sets for DASOC include 
counterterrorism, hostage rescue, and counter proliferation. Much of the structural 
foundations and employment models found throughout this article currently exist and 
would continue in the construct of DASOC. The methodology for generating Joint Task 
Forces and globally employing Special Operations Forces has been proven feasible under 
current counterterrorism authorities. 
 Each of these three distinct organizations, when directed, will stand up a 
specialized, mission-oriented Joint Task Force to conduct activities against a specified 
target. These Task Forces are filled primarily within USSOCOM units and represent a 
„cradle-to-grave‟ project mentality. 
Mission-Oriented Joint Task Forces 
A JTF is a joint force that is constituted and so designated by the [Secretary of 
Defense], a CCDR, a subordinate unified CDR, or an existing JTF CDR. A 
JTF may be established on a geographical area or functional basis when 
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the mission has a specific limited objective and does not require overall 
centralized control of logistics. --Joint Publication 1, pg. xvii 
 
 Unique within this proposal is the notion of cradle-to-grave, mission-oriented Joint 
Task Forces as the primary means of employing Special Operations Forces. Under this 
premise, and when authorized or directed, the sub-unified commander designates a JTF 
Commander, and primary and Special Staffs are fielded by USSOCOM units and the 
interagency. The new JTF analyzes its mission and requests tailored force packages to 
meet its objectives. For example, a notional JTF-AQIM (al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magrib) 






 Special Forces 
Groups, in addition to Civil Affairs and U.S. Navy SEALS, to illuminate the network‟s 
command structure in North Africa, its narco-trafficking connections in South America, 
and its fundraising operations in Europe. 
 This task organization allows forces to be employed against a problem set rather 
than to a geographic area. Any number of units can now be deployed to a region with 
their activities de-conflicted by mission, not geographic areas of operation. 
Operationalized JTFs rely heavily on assigned liaison personnel to de-conflict authorized 
activities with regional stakeholders including Geographic Combatant Commanders, 
Country Teams and, when necessary, the host nation or coalition partners. 
 The Joint Task Force is variable by size and scope based on the phases and 
authorities it is operating under. For instance, a JTF created for UW against a specific 
country would be relatively small during planning and while building infrastructure; 
however, the JTF would grow according to its needs if given the directive to execute its 
plan. 
 For long-term missions, the JTF creates its own playbook, coordinated at the 
USSOCOM headquarters with the Service Component Special Operations Commands, 
ensuring that once units are assigned to the JTF, those units regularly return for 
subsequent missions and deployments. Through this means, experience and expertise are 
developed and continually improved upon at the lowest operational level. Relationships 
and local knowledge are not reinvented with every deployment when a new unit assumes 
the mission from its predecessor. Such a process may lead to a shorter overall mission for 
the JTF and creates a more stable deployment cycle, easing burdens on the home-front.  
The Pan-Agency Special Staff 
Success of this model is predicated on the incorporation of a whole-of-government 
approach to problem solving. First, however, the author would like to take formal 
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umbrage with the term “interagency,” which is currently en vogue. The term, at its roots, 
denotes working between agencies, clearly indicating that the agencies hold equal and 
sometimes competing stakes in any given scenario. The author here will suggest the term 
„Pan-Agency‟ as better representative of coalition problem-solving capable of leveraging 
all assets of participating agencies for a common goal. Pan-Agency will be used 
henceforth to describe a synchronized, whole-of-government approach. 
 USSOCOM, in restructuring to meet global authority for Special Operations, would 
establish a Pan-Agency Special Staff (PASS) integrated with its traditional General Staff. 
Comprised of assigned representatives from Department-level U.S. Government 
Agencies, this Pan-Agency Special Staff contributes to mission analysis and resource 
requirements at the highest levels. A tailored PASS also accompanies each primary staff 
for the three sub-unified commands, but is not limited to Department-level agencies. For 
example, one might expect to see STRATDEVSOC PASS representatives from the 
Department of State, Department of Agriculture (DoAg), The Drug Enforcement Agency 
(DEA), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 
 The PASS differs from the doctrinal Joint Interagency Coordination Group in the 
function and role of its membership. The PASS offers a direct planning component to 
USSOCOM and sub-unified commanders, with limited tasking authority and 
coordination responsibility to their parent agency. Particularly nuanced, this aspect 
requires either the Commander-in-Chief to exercise his Chief Executive role or the 
Congress to permanently legislate Pan-Agency cooperation in the same tradition as 
„jointness‟ was codified under the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reform Act.  
 The PASS at each sub-unified command help tailor the resource package for the 
Joint Task Forces and provide synchronization with each agency‟s ongoing engagement 
strategies. Under this construct, one could expect to see DoAg and USAID personnel 
accompany a Civil Affairs team on Joint Combined Exchange Training to Angola; or 
providing DEA augmentation for Special Forces Operational Detachment - Alphas 
conducting Counter Narcotics Trafficking Training in South America.  
 The 2005 report Beyond Goldwater-Nichols by the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies recommended “national security agencies develop a national 
security career path that would give career professionals incentives to seek out 
interagency experience, education, and training.”11 The multi-level Pan-Agency Special 
Staffs described here provide the beginnings of such a career path. This facet of the plan 




 Though defined in Joint Publication 1, Unified Action is rarely is leveraged to 
maximum capacity. A PASS inherently functions as doctrinal Unified Action purports. 
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Unified action includes a wide scope of actions (including the synchronization of 
activities with other government agencies [OGAs], intergovernmental organizations 
[IGOs], and coordination with nongovernmental organizations [NGOs] and the private 
sector) taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or Joint 
Task Forces (JTFs) to achieve unity of effort.
13
 
Reconciling the Guidance 
The Defense Strategic Guidance provides a framework for analyzing the 
recommendations above and measuring the degree to which these recommendations 
would meet the intent of the National Command Authority. A cautionary note: while this 
methodology is meant as a cursory examination of the proposal, it is understood that 
strategic guidance often changes rapidly as administrations attempt to translate unique 
ideas to policy objectives. 
 In a fiscally-constrained budgetary environment, a globally synchronized Strategic 
Development Special Operations Command aids the economy-of-force tenets laid out in 
the DSG by prioritizing efforts and resources within USSOCOM across all Areas of 
Responsibility. “Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-
footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational 
presence, and advisory capabilities.”14 Additionally, the DSG describes the future of 
counterterrorism as being characterized by a mix of direct action and Security Force 
Assistance. This equal reliance on the indirect approach of security force assistance and 
traditional direct action justifies the elevation of the former to par with the latter within 
USSOCOM. 
 Further, in moving away from a strategy of fighting and winning two major 
regional conflicts nearly simultaneously, the DSG‟s new strategy of win-spoil justifies a 
robust unconventional warfare capability.  “Even when U.S. forces are committed to a 
large-scale operation in one region, they will be capable of denying the objectives of – or 
imposing unacceptable costs on – an opportunistic aggressor in a second region.”15 A 
standing Special Activities Command with an Unconventional Warfare focus provides 
the National Command Authority with an unprecedented capability meet the intent and 
guidance of the DSG. Synchronized utilization of standing networks, sabotage, and 
demonstrative air strikes in coordination with cyber-attack by sister components could 
blunt aggression with „unacceptable costs.‟ 
 Justification for a Direct Action Special Operation Command already exists; 
however, the DSG places reinforcing emphasis on counter proliferation and 
counterterrorism. 
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 From a budgetary perspective, the employment of tailored force-packages through 
mission-oriented Joint Task Forces is critical to maintaining American foreign policy 
objectives with minimum cost. Increasing individual knowledge and expertise to create 
true culturally-attuned, locally-savvy, subject matter experts reduces the overall 
inefficiencies and costs associated with ad hoc deployments. 
 The President‟s position in the opening letter of the DSG that “Meeting these 
challenges cannot be the work of the military alone” is a strong message to the 
Department of Defense and all U.S. Government agencies that interoperability, 
cooperation, and mutual support of all the tools of American power is the touchstone of 
future foreign policy.
16
 USSOCOM accomplishes this with the creation of the Pan-
Agency Special Staffs described above.  
 Redefining organizations based on mission types will refocus specialization. The 
preceding recommendations focus on operational structure and methods. As a byproduct, 
forces not engaged in operational activity would remain at home station under purview of 
respective Service Component Special Operations Command. Focus for these units is 
training and equipping with the knowledge that specialization is more important than 
generalization in order to hone the core competencies of each unique unit within 
USSOCOM.  Flexibility is not having a toolbox full of different sized adjustable 
wrenches; flexibility is having a box full of specialized tools designed for specific jobs.  
Conclusion 
The assumption that USSOCOM will inevitably be designated as a Global Combatant 
Commander for Special Operations is not a light one. Some readers may choose to ignore 
the recommendations of this article on the basis that this postulation is beyond the scope 
of current evidence.  The intent is not to pass judgment on professional opinions or 
personal feeling, but to accept the examination of future scenarios as critical to 
preparedness should they occur. 
 Furthermore, many may disagree with the fundamental structural changes 
recommended. Oft-cited counter points discuss a bi-lateral separation within USSOCOM 
of direct and indirect action capabilities. However, such a delineated structure does not 
adequately address the differences between overt and clandestine activities. For example, 
Foreign Internal Defense is often referred to as „the other side of the counterinsurgency‟ 
from Unconventional Warfare. While the act of training a Host Nation soldier or a 
guerrilla is essentially the same, the logistics, planning, and support to each activity are 
grossly different.  
 This essay sought to outline a structure and methodology by which the United 
States Special Operations Command could capitalize on expanded authorities and 
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responsibilities. The most recent Defense Strategic Guidance was used to justify and 
measure the amount to which such changes would benefit the nation and the military in a 
fiscally-constrained environment. The recommendations contained herein require further 
research, and a feasibility assessment must be conducted before implementation of any 
point proposed. Nonetheless, these recommendations offer the National Command 
Authority and the USSOCOM Commander a single-source global capability to prevent 
and deter large scale contingencies by leveraging a whole-of-government approach 
through Special Operations Forces operating as the forward edge of American influence: 
building capacity and capability in friendly nation forces; developing influence and 
infrastructure in under-governed regions; limiting belligerent nation ability to project 
threats while countering terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction proliferation—in 
short, honing the edge of the Tip of the Spear. 
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